“American Foreign Policy in Asia”
Or
“Conflating the Orient and the Occident”
By: J. Thomas Hunter
Or
“Conflating the Orient and the Occident”
By: J. Thomas Hunter
President Barack Obama will spend this week meeting with Asian leaders about various policies that will affect America’s relationship with the region. He arrives in Asia with a list of lofty objectives, among them, to reach an agreement on cutting greenhouse gases, to recruit allies in the war against nuclear proliferation, and to convince nations like China to assist America’s economic recovery. So far, though, the American president has been unsuccessful. Jonathan Weisman recounts Obama’s failures in the Wall Street Journal, writing, “Half way through his Asian tour, Mr. Obama is confronting the limits of engagement and personal charm…Indeed, the Asia trip is exposing the limits of Mr. Obama’s policy of engagement.”[1] The President could not have arrived in Asia at a more tumultuous time: First, tempers flared last week after a naval skirmish between North and South Korea left one North Korean sailor dead and three others wounded.[2] Secondly, an historic election in Japan pits an anti-alliance government against the conciliatory American president.[3] Finally, American interests are at risk as China indiscriminately builds relationships with wealthy despots—like Iran’s President, Mahmoud Ahmadenejad. Asia is complex—as Obama has surely discovered. A series of policy pieces from the American Enterprise Institute and The Heritage Foundation detail the obstacles American foreign policy faces in Asia, and why the President has encountered such difficulty.Big Trouble in Little China
For years, the Sino-American alliance has been a balancing act of economic interests and policy. Because the United States’ economy is larger than the next five economies combined, China has compromised some policy positions in exchange for access to the American market. That pleasant reality has changed, slightly, since the economic crash of 2008. In feeble attempts to save their economies from complete ruin, both the United States and China have instituted economic stimulus plans that threaten the future prosperity of the respective nations. China’s stimulus package promises $585,000,000,000 in government spending along with an additional $1,100,000,000,000 of new loans to banks and firms. The stimulus to banks must be used to liberally offer loans to business firms and private citizens. That demand has forced banks to offer almost no returns on private savings and investments—to cover the costs of inevitable loan defaults—and consequently, has killed any incentive for Chinese citizens to invest and save money in banks. Asian Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, Dr. Derek Scissors, writes that the unfortunate result of the Chinese stimulus package is “more money in the hands of firms to make things and less for households to buy things.”[4] This arrangement harms U.S. businesses that try to expand their market into China.In addition to the adverse effects of the short-sighted Chinese stimulus package, a greater threat looms—Protectionism. Dr. Scissors reports that while an increase in Chinese consumption usually corresponds with an increase in imports, in the first three quarters of 2009, Chinese “retail sales rose 15% while imports fell 20%.” Scissors posits that this is a result of Chinese protectionist impulses. “…Any hint that internal consumption could divorce from imports must be watched very closely,” he advises. President Obama, too, must turn a deaf ear to the seductive pleas of American protectionists. International trade—especially with China—strengthens our economies, and our shared strategic interests. If Sino-American trade suffers, then American foreign policy will also suffer.
T
hat point is made clear with regards to China’s nuclear nonproliferation policy that equates to tough talk for countries other than Iran and North Korea. One of Obama’s goals is to convince China to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty and join the United States in calling for the end of North Korea’s and Iran’s nuclear weapons programs. As a key member of the U.N. Security Council, especially as one of the members granted veto power, China’s acquiescence could be a positive step toward that end. Unfortunately, China values its trade relationships with the two rogue nations more than it fears their acquisition of nuclear weapons. Writing for the Heritage Foundation, Dean Cheng makes the point, “…There is little evidence that Beijing is prepared to meaningfully curtail trade or other interactions with either state [Iran and North Korea], thereby undermining any chance of success for any multinational sanctions regime."For American foreign policy, China poses a formidable obstacle.
Dark Clouds in the Land of the Rising Sun
America’s relationship with Japan sours by the day. Since the historic election of the Democrat Party of Japan (DPJ), Japan has withdrawn from its role as U.S. ally and as world power. Obama’s goal should be to coax the Japanese back to their senses, or placate the new government to preserve what is left of the Japanese-American relationship.The DPJ, which has only won 2 elections in 50 years, ran on a platform of divorce from the U.S.-Japan alliance. The previous ruling party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) lost power after a slew of scandals and the economic downturn convinced voters that the LDP was feckless and incapable of helping the common Japanese citizen. The DPJ sloughed criticism that they were “amateurish” by embracing a big tent ideology to amass members from diverse political factions to storm into power in the last election.
The DPJ capitalized on domestic issues—at the expense of foreign affairs—and appealed to the Japanese electorate’s disinterest in foreign policy. Even worse, for America, the DPJ regularly espouses anti-alliance rhetoric. The Heritage Foundation’s Asia Expert, Bruce Klingner, recounts some of the DPJ’s laments. Klingner writes, “The DPJ depicts Japan’s previous overseas deployments as forced concessions to U.S. demands in the name of the alliance, rather than as the contributions of a major nation to international security challenges.”[5]
Klingner continues, “The DPJ has pledged to be more resistant to future security requests from the U.S.”
America seemingly cannot convince the Japanese government to send more troops to Afghanistan—or anywhere they could be of service. The DPJ has halted previous plans to help refuel American naval vessels in the Indian Ocean—a strategic refueling center for American troops in the Middle East. The new government has also vacillated on upholding U.N. Resolution 1874, which required Japan to intercept and inspect North Korean cargo vessels. Indeed, Japan, under its new leadership, shrinks from the responsibilities of a regional and world power.
While the Obama Administration publicly downplays its frustrations with the DPJ, Klingner noted an inconsistency when he personally interviewed administration officials—in private. Rather than flippantly ignore the DPJ’s sentiments, American officials decried what they called “very serious problems” with the new Japanese government.
P
erhaps the most serious of the problems America is having with Japan revolves around U.S. military bases in Okinawa. In 2006, the American and Japan signed an agreement to move a Marine Corps base from a densely populated part of Okinawa to a more remote location. The treaty returns control of several U.S. bases to Okinawa authorities. Despite an absence of unanimity among DPJ members, the party calls for a precipitous and complete withdrawal of Marine bases from the island. Instead of basing in Okinawa, the DPJ suggests that the U.S. move 1,400 miles away—to Guam. The American Enterprise Institute’s, Michael Auslin, maintains that issue stands to drive a serious wedge between Japan and the United States—two nations that have experienced strained relations for years. “The current blow-up,” Auslin writes, “reflects the slow drift of the U.S.-Japan alliance from the earlier part of this decade.”[6] Auslin predicts that unless this concern is properly addressed, Japan and the U.S. will supplant one another with other regional powers.According to Auslin, “President Obama’s ability to smooth over some significant disagreements between the two allies may set the tone for the remainder of his administration.”
A Tale of Two Cities: Seoul and Pyongyang
O
bama’s obvious interest on the Korean peninsula is staunching Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons development. South Korean President, Lee Myung-bak, enthusiastically supports this aim, especially after a naval battle between the two nations further strained unification efforts. Two aspects of America’s policy toward North Korea concern President Lee, however. First, Lee worries that North Korea’s misbehavior will attract America’s attention to the point that America will ignore priorities important to South Korea. Secondly, Lee worries that Obama will make good on his promise to unilaterally meet with North Korea, and in so doing, nullify the six party talks. The American president would be wise to consider President Lee’s suggestions.As far as Western security is concerned, South Korea has proved an eager and willing partner to the United States. While Japan insists on “revisiting” its commitment to fighting in Afghanistan—proposing to help finance war efforts rather than send troops or provide logistical support—South Korea vows to send money, support and troops to the warfront. Potentially the easiest stop on his Asia tour, South Korea remains one of Obama’s and America’s most reliable allies.
Asia differs from many continents in that a clear regional leader has not been determined. The prospect of intra-continental alliances complicates American policy, and hinges on fickle electorates, fickle political leaders, and fickle economic realities. In order for America to remain relevant in Asia, it must protect its juggernaut of an economy so that other nations recognize the connection between their futures and American interests. Protecting the American economy means not capitulating to protectionists, not incurring crippling debt, and not ignoring destabilizing actors in the region. Obama’s excursion has surely opened his eyes to some of the frustrating nuances of Asian politics, but hopefully, he also recognizes the many opportunities America has to form and maintain lasting partnerships.
Article Sources:
[1] http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125827619829149095.html?mod=rss_Politics_And_Policy
[2] http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/12/AR2009111203773.html?wprss=rss_world
[3] http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg2340.cfm#_ftn1
[4] http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/wm2696.cfm
[5] http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg2340.cfm#_ftn1
[6] http://www.aei.org/article/101301
Photo Source: "Obama in Japan" from http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/images/attachement/jpg/site1/20091114/0013729e45180c68a5f422.jpg; "Chinese President, Hu Jintao" from http://is.china-embassy.org/eng/xwdt/W020060101209907667507.jpg; "China & North Korea Flag" from http://www.topnews.in/files/China-North-Korea-71253.jpg; "Japanese Flag" from http://www.studyabroad.org/images/japan.jpg; "Marine Bases on Okinawa" from http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg2340.cfm#_ftn1; "North and South Korea Flags" from http://filipspagnoli.files.wordpress.com/2008/09/north-and-south-korean-flags.jpg;
